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In	my	youth	almost	a	half-century	ago,	I	attended	a	school	dedicated	to	the	
subordination	of	its	students.	The	teachers	made	incessant	demands	on	their	
students.	Inadequacies	in	their	performances	were	publicly	observed	without	
pity	and	often	in	the	most	insulting	terms.
We	 students	 at	 that	 school	 were	 almost	 randomly	 selected.	We	 did	 not	
choose	to	go	there	and,	 indeed,	most	of	us	did	not	want	to	go	to	school	at	
all.	Certainly	none	of	us	relished	the	incessant	demands	and	insults.	We	were	
forced	to	do	what	had	to	be	done	when	it	had	to	be	done,	and	we	gradually	
acquired	the	habit	of	prompt	obedience.
But	 we	 acquired	 other	 traits	 as	 well.	 The	 teachers’	 seeming	 inhumanity	
had	 at	 least	 three	 redemptive	 consequences.	 The	most	 obvious	 was	 that	 it	
demonstrated	 their	 conviction	 that	 their	 work,	 and	 hence	 the	 work	 they	
demanded	 of	 their	 students,	 was	 important	 and	 possible.	 They	 could	 not	
have	all	been	that	grouchy	had	they	been	taking	their	tasks	lightly	or	had	they	
expected	that	we	would	fail	if	we	tried	hard	enough.
Secondly,	 their	 gruffness	 conferred	 on	 most	 of	 us	 a	 valuable	 sense	 of	
survivorship.	 Most	 of	 us	 succeeded	 at	 least	 marginally	 at	 the	 seemingly	
important	feats	required,	and	they	were	not	easy.	Especially	for	those	of	us	who	
were	not	very	good	students	in	that	school,	minimal	success	was	a	considerable	
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gratification.	 To	 use	 a	 term	 not	 then	 known,	 most	 of	 us	 acquired	 a	 new	
measure	of	self-esteem	derived	not	from	praise	by	others	but	from	achievement	
permitting	self-praise.	In	part,	this	was	because	failure	was	obviously	possible;	
a	few	students	who	could	not	achieve	minimum	standards	were	sent	home.
Finally,	the	teachers’	hateful	conduct	created	among	the	students	a	sense	
of	 interdependency—they	provided	their	 students	with	a	common	adversary	
against	 whom	 we	 could	 and	 did	 respond	 together.	 We	 formed	 bonds	 of	
mutual	trust.	We	became	artificial	siblings.	This	was	extraordinary,	given	that	
our	backgrounds	of	race	and	class	were	as	different	as	can	be	imagined,	and	
that	the	school	had	only	very	recently	been	racially	desegregated.
I	was	twenty-four	years	old	when	I	attended	that	school,	and	I	was	a	lawyer.	
Most	of	my	fellow	students	in	1955	were	nineteen	or	twenty.	My	special	brothers	
included	a	black	operator	of	a	shoe	shine	stand	at	the	Corpus	Christi	railroad	
station,	a	Hispanic	grocery	clerk	from	San	Antonio,	a	black	warehouse	guard	
from	Oakland,	and	a	Japanese-American	from	Redding	who	had	lived	for	four	
years	 in	an	 internment	camp	 in	Utah.	My	 immediate	circle	also	 included	a	
butcher	from	Las	Vegas	and	a	guy	who	aspired	to	be	a	professional	golfer.	One	
of	them	may	well	have	been	gay;	we	did	not	ask	and	he	did	not	tell.	It	was	my	
buddy	from	Corpus	Christi	who	pushed	me	over	the	training	barricade	that	
I	was	not	strong	enough	to	climb.	He	saved	me	from	additional	humiliation	
and	stress,	a	kind	deed	I	could	never	have	repaid.	The	school	was,	of	course,	
basic	 infantry	 training,	 and	almost	 all	of	us	had	been	 selected	by	our	 local	
draft	boards.
From	my	present	perspective,	I	would	have	to	say	that	basic	infantry	training	
was	the	most	effective	educational	 institution	I	ever	had	the	opportunity	to	
observe.	The	Phillips	Exeter	Academy	(from	which	I	was	quite	appropriately	
expelled)	and	the	Harvard	Law	School	(from	which	I	was	not	expelled)	made	
strong	impressions	on	me,	and	the	other	schools	I	attended	were	also	pretty	
good.	But	neither	Exeter	nor	Harvard	achieved	in	years	what	the	United	States	
Army	did	in	weeks	to	make	adults	out	of	almost	all	of	us	involuntary	selectees.	
I	have,	alas,	not	kept	up	with	my	military	brothers,	but	I	am	as	certain	as	one	
can	be	about	such	matters	that	they	met	the	chances	of	life	with	measurably	
greater	 competence	 and	 composure	 than	 they	would	 have	 absent	what	 the	
Army	did	to	and	for	them	in	eight	short	weeks.	Happily,	I	know	almost	for	
certain	that	none	of	them	was	ever	in	military	combat.
My	respect	for	what	the	Army	did	is	not	linked	to	any	militaristic	impulses	
on	 my	 part.	 I	 was	 grateful	 that	 the	 Army	 thought	 me	 unpromising	 as	 an	
infantryman,	 and	 later	 trained	 me	 to	 type	 and	 fill	 out	 forms.	 I	 was	 never	
happier	than	the	day	I	left	active	duty	as	a	soldier.	But	passage	of	more	than	a	
half-century	has	not	erased	my	affection	for	my	military	buddies,	nor	has	my	
distaste	for	the	military	enterprise	prevented	me	from	continuing	to	admire	the	
drill	sergeants	(perhaps	especially	the	brutal	black	female	corporal)	who	did	
their	work	with	such	spirit	and	effect.
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In	 varying	 degrees,	 hierarchy	 is	 indispensable	 to	 all	 human	 endeavors	
entailing	organized	collaboration.	Most	that	are	worthwhile	require	 it.	One	
can	draw	a	picture	without	hierarchy,	but	one	 cannot	play	 in	 an	orchestra.	
An	infantry	unit	without	hierarchy	is	a	mob,	and	one	organized	by	students	
passionately	 resistant	 to	 hierarchy1	 would,	 in	military	 combat,	 have	 been	 a	
suicide	pact.	Could	there	be	a	ballet	troupe,	a	basketball	team,	a	hospital,	or	
an	industrial	organization	of	whatever	kind	in	a	leftist	heaven	that	excluded	
hierarchy?	Many	of	our	most	valued	freedoms	depend	on	restraints	imposed	
by	hierarchs	of	one	kind	or	another,	and	there	is,	therefore,	nothing	inherently	
wrong	with	 reproducing	 it	 in	 a	 classroom	devoted	 to	professional	 training.	
Everything	 depends	 on	 the	 purpose	 of	 a	 hierarchy	 and	 the	 fitness	 of	 its	
methods	to	that	purpose.
No	mid-20th	century	law	school	such	as	the	one	I	attended	was	reproducing	
hierarchy	for	its	own	sake.	Law	schools	were	then	striving	to	fit	their	students	
for	professional	work	in	a	world	filled	will	all	kinds	of	hierarchies,	many	bad	
but	many	good.2	They	were,	among	other	objectives,	trying	to	fit	their	students	
with	the	moral	and	intellectual	strength	and	self-confidence	to	exercise	prudent	
professional	 judgment	 in	 distinguishing	 good	 from	 bad	 and	 to	 withstand	
the	 sometimes	horrific	 stress	 they	would	experience	 in	vigorously	contested	
circumstances	 of	whatever	 sort.	Most	 law	 teachers	 then	 supposed,	whether	
correctly	 or	 not,	 that	 treating	 adult	 students	 as	 immature	 persons	 needing	
emotional	nurture	and	intellectual	succor	was	not	the	way	to	prepare	them	for	
the	moral	and	intellectual	combat	that	pervades	the	work	of	American	lawyers.
My	most	stressful	moment	came	about	six	weeks	into	the	first	year.	Professor	
Austin	Scott	called	on	me	to	inform	the	class	of	125	students	about	the	next	
case.	I	froze,	and	said	that	I	was	not	prepared.	His	response	was:	“Well,	Mr.	
Carrington,	what	have	you	read?	We	will	talk	about	that.”	It	helped	that	he	
had	a	twinkle	in	his	eye,	and	I	did	survive	to	find	something	to	say.
But	if	some	students	found	the	stress	of	managing	their	own	professional	
development	too	stressful	and	left	the	school	to	pursue	a	different	career,	that	
was	not	a	cause	for	regret	but	an	indication	that	the	schools	were	serving	their	
students	(perhaps	especially	the	former	students	who	left)	and	the	public	well.
The	war	in	Vietnam	and	the	reactions	it	engendered	among	students	tended	
to	 infect	 law	 student	 anxiety	 with	mistrust	 of	 teachers	 as	 persons	 engaged	
merely	 in	 self-gratification.	The	mistrust	was	 compounded	by	 the	arrival	 in	
law	schools	in	numbers,	first	of	students	of	color,	and	then	of	women,	many	
of	whom	were	quick	to	suppose	that	teachers	were	motivated	by	an	ambition	
to	humiliate	them.	It	is	possible	that	many	of	the	women	were	“hard-wired”	to	
need	and	thus	demand	mentoring	relationships	that	law	teachers	of	that	time	
were	not	equipped	to	supply.	As	a	consequence	of	the	efforts	by	law	teachers	to	
1.	 E.g.,	Duncan	Kennedy,	Legal	Education	and	 the	Reproduction	of	Hierarchy:	A	Polemic	
Against	the	System	(New	York	Univ.	Press	2003).
2.	 For	an	account	of	the	Yale	Law	School	of	that	era,	see	Laura	Kalman,	Yale	Law	School	and	
The	Sixties:	Revolt	and	Reverberations	(Univ.	of	North	Carolina	Press	2005).
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respond	to	student	mistrust	and	their	demands	for	nurture,	law	school	became	
almost	everywhere	less	stressful,	and	students	were	less	frequently	required	to	
participate	actively	and	competitively	in	their	own	instruction.
If	law	teachers	of	that	and	earlier	times	were	right	in	their	assumptions	that	
they	were	not	merely	instructing	students	in	law	but	were	preparing	them	for	
professional	work	as	 lawyers,	 and	 that	professional	work	 is	 in	almost	all	 its	
forms	competitive	and	stressful,	and	often	laden	with	moral	ambiguities,	the	
reforms	effected	in	response	to	the	mistrust	of	their	students	may	have	been	
counterproductive.	Law	school	graduates	may	have	been	 less	well	prepared	
than	they	might	have	been	for	the	professional	work	they	sought	to	perform.	
And	they	may	have	had	less	moral	autonomy	of	the	sort	that	enabled	them	to	
withstand	the	corruption	and	moral	squalor	that	is	the	stuff	of	human	conflict	
with	which	lawyers	must	deal.
For	 example,	would	 the	 lawyers	who	 later	helped	 the	 accountants	 shred	
Enron	 documents	 have	 performed	 more	 admirably	 had	 they	 been	 better	
educated	in	law	school?	Would	the	lawyers	advising	the	reckless	bankers	of	
the	 21st	 century	 have	 given	 better	 advice	 had	 they	 been	 better	 educated?	 I	
reject	the	arrogant	utterance	of	Professor	Felix	Frankfurter	that	“lawyers	are	
what	the	law	schools	make	them.”3	The	opposite	would	be	far	more	accurate.	
Steven	 Pinker	 has	 thoroughly	 refuted	 the	 widely	 shared	 premise	 that	 our	
children,	or	even	our	law	students,	are	blank	slates	on	which	we	can	write	a	
message	of	our	choosing.4	Mostly,	students,	even	law	students,	get	their	morals	
from	their	peers.	If	Enron’s	or	the	bankers’	lawyers	grew	up	among	neighbors	
and	attended	schools	and	universities	with	fellow	students	who	measure	one	
another	by	such	superficialities	as	 their	annual	earnings,	without	 regard	 for	
their	 professional	 integrity	 or	 the	 worthiness	 of	 the	 services	 they	 perform,	
no	professional	school	can	do	very	much	to	change	that.	Nevertheless,	mid-
20th	 century	 law	 teachers	may	 not	 have	 been	wrong	 to	 suppose	 that	moral	
education	is	possible.	And	moral	education	may	be	the	most	important	and	
enduring	consequence	of	good	professional	training	in	law.
If	 law	 teachers	 today	 sought	 to	 prepare	 their	 students	 to	 withstand	 the	
moral	 squalor	 they	 are	 certain	 to	 encounter	 in	 performing	 legal	 services,	
how	might	they	pursue	that	goal?	They	might	seek	to	foster	in	their	students	
the	gratification	 that	comes	 from	earned	self-respect	derived	 from	surviving	
rigorous	demands	with	little	help	from	intellectual	and	moral	nursemaids,	in	
the	hope	that	the	moral	and	intellectual	autonomy	thus	developed	might	be	
put,	at	 least	sometimes,	 to	good	public	use.	Would	a	 law	school	guided	by	
such	aims	resemble	basic	infantry	training?	Maybe	a	little.
3.	 Letter	to	R.	Rosenwald,	May	13,	1927,	quoted	in	Rand	Jack	&	Dana	Crowley	Jack,	Moral	
Vision	and	Professional	Decisions:	The	Changing	Values	of	Women	and	Men	Lawyers	156	
(Cambridge	Univ.	Press	1989).
4.	 Steven	Pinker,	The	Blank	Slate:	The	Modern	Denial	of	Human	Nature	(Penguin	Books	
2002).
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Or	maybe	it	would	bear	more	resemblance	to	the	law	school	that	featured	
the	teaching	of	Edward	“Bull”	Warren,	whose	legendary	antics	recorded	in	the	
lore	of	the	Harvard	Law	School	provided	the	anecdotes	in	Paper Chase.5	The	
school	in	which	he	taught	took	form	in	the	late	19th	century	in	response	to	the	
idea	of	Charles	Eliot,	Harvard’s	president,	who	predicted	that	 if	 law	school	
were	made	long	and	hard,	the	most	promising	professional	students	would	be	
attracted	by	the	challenge	and	opportunity	to	elevate	themselves	within	the	
social	and	professional	hierarchy.6
In	the	academic	marketplace	of	the	19th	century,	Eliot’s	idea	was	a	resounding	
success.	 Accordingly,	 The	 Bull’s	 students	 were	 attracted	 by	 his	 sometimes	
brutal	manners	that	supplied	the	basis	for	his	fame	among	several	generations	
of	Harvard	Law	students.	A	native	of	Worcester,	his	transformative	experience	
was	a	leadership	role	on	the	Harvard Crimson,	where	he	learned	that	rejection	
by	President	Eliot	was	a	first	step	to	triumph.7	He	experienced	legal	education	
with	four	memorable	professors.	The	teacher	he	most	admired	was	James	Barr	
Ames	who	conducted	classes	“chiefly	by	means	of	Socratic	dialogues	between	
himself	and	fifteen	or	twenty	of	the	best	students	who	formed,	so	to	speak,	a	
Greek	chorus.”8	But	he	also	observed	that	Judge	Jeremiah	Smith	was	a	man	
“overflowing	with	the	milk	of	human	kindness.”9	In	1899,	while	Warren	was	
a	third	year	student,	he	was	identified	by	Dean	Ames	as	a	promising	teacher	
who	would	employ	the	rigorous	Ames	style.	But	he	practiced	with	a	large	firm	
in	New	York	before	returning	to	the	law	school	in	1904	to	become	a	legendary	
teacher	on	the	Ames	model.
It	was	no	part	of	Warren’s	objective	as	a	Socratic	teacher	to	train	students	
to	be	weak	subordinates	in	morally	corrupt	hierarchies,	as	some	students	in	
later	generations	may	have	supposed	that	their	teachers	were	doing.10	Students	
who	survived	The	Bull’s	teaching	were	more	likely,	The	Bull	thought,	to	insist	
5.	 All	the	stories	in	that	celebrated	novel	were	circulating	at	the	Harvard	Law	School	in	1952	
when	I	was	a	first	year	student.	It	is	not	unlikely	that	many	of	them	had	gained	color	from	
frequent	repetition.	The	novelist	used	all	but	one	of	the	stories	I	heard	about	“Bull”	Warren.	
The	one	that	the	novelist	did	not	use	was	my	favorite.	It	was	reported	that	a	student	was	
so	agitated	after	reading	the	Property	examination	questions	that	he	drank	his	ink.	He	was	
taken	to	a	convenient	nursing	station	in	Ames	Hall	where	the	ink	could	be	pumped	out	of	
his	stomach.	As	he	was	returning	to	consciousness,	The	Bull	entered	the	nursing	station	and	
asked	him	how	he	was	feeling.	“OK,	I	guess,	Professor	Warren.”	“That’s	good,”	The	Bull	
was	alleged	to	have	said,	“because	you	have	only	forty-five	minutes	to	finish	the	exam.”
6.	 On	Eliot’s	 selection	of	Dean	Langdell,	 see	Bruce	A.	Kimball,	The	Inception	of	Modern	
Professional	Education:	C.C.	Langdell,	1826–1906	86	(Univ.	of	North	Carolina	Press	2009);	
on	his	influence	on	the	school,	see id. passim.
7.	 Edward	H.	Warren,	Spartan	Education	3	(Houghton	Mifflin	1942).
8.	 Id.	at	7.	Kimball,	supra	note	6,	at	262,	describes	Ames	as	often	insulting	and	dismissive	in	
class.
9.	 	Id.	at	6.
10.	 For	an	account	of	Harvard	Law	School	 in	Kennedy’s	 time	as	 a	 student	at	Yale,	 see	 Joel	
Seligman,	The	High	Citadel:	The	 Influence	 of	Harvard	Law	School	 93–201	 (Houghton	
Mifflin	1978).
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on	 thinking	 for	 themselves.	 In	his	 retrospection,	he	observed	 that	 the	most	
important	attribute	a	lawyer	can	have	is	“the	confidence	of	other	people	that	
he	can	be	trusted	always	to	do	the	decent	thing.”11	It	is	not	obvious	that	this	
trait	is	acquired	by	the	Socratic	method.	But	his	students	were	likely	to	have	
shared	a	sense	that	what	they	had	achieved	was	important,	and	perhaps	not	
merely	to	themselves.	They	might	also	have	gained	self-respect	by	surviving	an	
emotional	as	well	as	an	intellectual	challenge.	And	they	might	have	tended	to	
bond	with	their	classmates	as	members	of	a	profession	making	moral	demands.	
The	key	to	professional	virtue	in	Warren’s	mind	was	discipline:
I	believe	 in	discipline.	From	boyhood	days	on,	I	have	sought	 to	discipline	
my	own	mind,	pen	and	tongue.	(As	a	teacher)	I	have	sought	to	discipline	the	
minds,	pen,	and	tongues	of	my	students.	I	have	never	suffered	fools	gladly,	
and	regard	such	sufferances	as	mischievous.12
In	his	way,	The	Bull	plainly	strove	to	“teach	law	in	the	grand	manner,”	as	
Holmes	had	designated	the	method.13	The	larger	aim	was,	as	Holmes	had	it,	to	
enable	the	student	to	become	“reasonable,	and	see	things	in	their	proportion”:
Nay,	more,	that	he	should	be	passionate	as	well	as	reasonable—that	he	should	
be	able	not	only	to	explain,	but	to	feel,	that	the	ardors	of	intellectual	pursuit	
should	be	relieved	by	the	charms	of	art,	should	be	succeeded	by	the	joy	of	life,	
become	an	end	in	itself.14
One	 may	 be	 skeptical	 that	 the	 Socratic	 method	 as	 practiced	 by	 “Bull”	
Warren	could	have	achieved	the	intended	outcome.	Yet,	I	have	actually	known	
quite	a	few	of	“Bull”	Warren’s	students	because	my	father	was	one	of	them,	
and	over	the	years	I	met	many	of	his	Harvard	Law	1917	contemporaries,	and	
more	than	a	few	manifested	the	traits	The	Bull	sought	to	“nurture.”
I	never	had	occasion	 to	discuss	with	 any	of	 them	 their	 reactions	 to	The	
Bull.	I	wonder	how	he	might	have	scored	on	21st	century	student	evaluations	
of	his	teaching.	All	his	students	whom	I	met	except	my	father	were	in	their	
seniority	when	I	met	them.	Some	were	rather	pompous,	self-seeking	persons	
who	might,	as	best	I	could	tell,	have	been	the	sort	of	lawyers	who	would	have	
shredded	Enron	documents	without	a	blink,	and	papered	over	the	misdeeds	
of	21st	century	bankers,	at	least	if	well	paid	to	do	so.	But	others	I	knew	were	
morally	 formidable	 and	 autonomous	persons	who	would	have	 participated	
11.	 Warren,	supra	note	7,	at	28.
12.	 Id.	at	ix.
13.	 Oliver	Wendell	Holmes,	Jr.,	The	Use	of	Law	Schools,	in	Speeches	265	(Little,	Brown	and	
Co.	1913).	For	that	and	many	other	contemporaneous	comments	on	the	teaching	method,	
see	 The	 History	 of	 Legal	 Education	 in	 the	 United	 States:	 Commentaries	 and	 Primary	
Sources	495–583	(Steve	Sheppard	ed.,	Salem	Press	1999).	A	bibliography	on	the	subject	is	
provided	in	The	Centennial	History	of	the	Harvard	Law	School	1817–1917,	365–376	(Harvard	
Law	School	Association	1918).
14.	 Id.
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in	such	a	desperate	act	only	after	exercising	 independent	and	critical	moral	
judgment	 and	 reaching	 the	 unlikely	 conclusion	 that	 the	world	would	 be	 a	
better	place	if	the	documents	were	shredded	or	the	loans	repackaged.
This	 assessment	 is	 not	 based	 merely	 on	 my	 intuitive	 reading	 of	 their	
characters.	Dean	Acheson,15	for	one	member	of	the	class,	had	the	moral	starch	
in	1937	to	resign	as	Undersecretary	of	the	Treasury	because	of	his	belief	that	
President	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt’s	monetary	policy	was	morally	reprehensible.	
In	1948,	he	(with	Secretary	of	State	George	Marshall)	gave	President	Truman	
the	very	unwelcome	advice	that	recognition	of	a	Zionist	state	would	result	in	a	
permanent	state	of	undeclared	war	between	the	United	States	and	the	Muslim	
world.	In	1949,	he	improvidently	stood	up	for	Alger	Hiss.	In	1951,	he	stood	up	
to	Joseph	McCarthy.
My	 father’s	 roommate,	 a	 fellow	 Missourian,	 Claude	 Cross,	 practiced	
in	 Boston	 for	 many	 years,	 and	 exhibited	 his	 moral	 toughness	 when	 he	
undertook	 the	 defense	 of	Alger	Hiss.	One	may	 question	Cross’s	 judgment	
if	he	lied	on	his	client’s	behalf,	but	one	cannot	question	his	moral	toughness	
and	independence.16	Raeburn	Green,	another	Missourian,	practiced	in	Saint	
Louis,	advising	business	clients,	and	in	1950,	pro	bono	publico,	he	defended	
members	of	the	Communist	Party	against	diverse	criminal	charges.
Kenneth	Royall	practiced	in	Raleigh	representing	business	interests	until	
he	was	activated	as	a	colonel	in	the	JAG	Corps.	A	few	months	thereafter,	in	
1942,	he	was	assigned	to	defend	German	saboteurs,	and	he	took	their	case	to	
civil	courts	and	to	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	in	direct	defiance	
of	his	commander-in-chief.17	He	lost	the	case	but	cherished	the	admiring	note	
he	received	from	a	client	shortly	before	the	client’s	execution.	Royall	also	took	
a	stand	against	Senator	McCarthy.18
And	the	end	of	that	Senator’s	vicious	tirade	came	when	Joe	Welch,	a	farm	
boy	from	Iowa	who	had	spent	a	career	trying	cases	in	Boston,	stood	up	to	him	
on	behalf	of	clients	he	was	serving	pro	bono	publico.	What	Acheson,	Cross,	
Green,	Royall,	and	Welch	did	in	these	events	was	to	put	their	careers	at	risk	to	
do	what	they	perceived	to	be	“the	decent	thing.”	Other	members	of	that	Class	
of	1917	(including	my	father)	performed	other	less	noted	acts,	public	services	
sometimes	rendered	at	substantial	cost	to	themselves.
No	one	can	say	that	any	of	these	courageous	public	acts	were	a	consequence	
of	the	teaching	of	The	Bull.	But	it	is	possible	that	they	learned	in	law	school	to	
look	out	for	their	own	moral	standards	without	close	guidance	from	mentors,	
15.	 Acheson	wrote	four	volumes	of	autobiography	and	he	is	the	subject	of	five	biographies.
16.	 He	argued	 that	 lawyers	 sometimes	have	a	duty	 to	 lie	 in	Charles	P.	Curtis,	The	Ethics	of	
Advocacy,	4	Stan.	L.	Rev.	3	(1951).	A	response	is	Henry	S.	Drinker,	Some	Remarks	on	Mr.	
Curtis’	“The	Ethics	of	Advocacy,”	4	Stan.	L.	Rev.	349	(1952).
17.	 Ex	parte	Quirin,	317	U.S.	1	(1942);	for	an	account,	see	Paul	D.	Carrington,	A	Military	Salute,	
12	Green	Bag	2d	19	(2008).
18.	 See	his	essay,	American	Freedom	and	the	Law:	Fighting	the	Communist	Menace,	40	A.B.A.	
J.	559	(1953).
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and	gained	confidence	in	their	ability	to	do	so.	I	am	sure	that	many	of	them	
practiced	law	with	moral	courage,	and	we	can	say	that	The	Bull’s	teaching,	so	
despicable	to	many	students	of	a	later	generation,	had	that	result	as	its	aim.	
Maybe	it	even	had	some	of	that	effect.	I	doubt	that	teachers	who	would	have	
provided	more	 gratification	 and	 comfort	 to	 students	 of	Duncan	Kennedy’s	
generation	would	have	been	likely	to	have	done	better	in	training	students	to	
stand	on	their	own	moral	and	intellectual	feet.
I	wonder	how	The	Bull	would	 teach	 law	students	 in	 the	21st	 century.	He	
would	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 troubling	 change	 in	 law	 firms	 advising	 large	
corporate	enterprises	such	as	Enron	as	well	as	those	attorneys	more	recently	
revealed	 to	 share	 responsibility	 for	 the	 economic	 chaos	 of	 2008.	 Lawyers	
in	 such	 organizations	 are	 increasingly	 subordinates	 in	 hierarchies	 that	 are	
sometimes	uncaring.19	While	members	of	the	Class	of	1917	were	often	called	
by	 their	 clients	 for	broad	 advice,	 today’s	 large	firm	partners	 less	 frequently	
have	the	kind	of	stable	relationship	with	their	clients	that	results	in	that	kind	
of	consultation.	It	may	well	be,	for	example,	that	no	independent	lawyer	(i.e.,	
one	who	had	not	been	subordinated	by	his	or	her	corporate	managers)	was	
ever	invited	to	give	advice	about	the	antics	of	many	of	the	corporate	executives	
who	have	recently	been	disgraced.	What	legal	advice	could	and	should	have	
been	given	to	Lehman	Brothers	or	AIG?	Even	The	Bull	could	not	hope	to	do	
much	about	their	irresponsible	behavior.
Moreover,	even	The	Bull	would	need	to	confront	the	destructive	force	of	
law	school	rankings,	which	have	a	paralyzing	effect	on	the	freedom	of	most	law	
schools	to	do	anything	that	might	diminish	their	relative	standings.	Virtually	
every	measurement	of	law	schools	employed	in	rankings	counts	expenditures,	
and	virtually	all	 available	 funds	must	be	 spent	 to	protect	 schools	 rankings.	
Also,	their	shared	preoccupation	with	such	matters	must	tend	to	reinforce	in	
students	a	sense	that	it	is	affect	and	not	substance	that	matters.	Law	students	
are	now	consumers.	Maybe	today’s	basic	infantry	trainees	are,	too.
A	 few	 years	 ago,	 I	 proposed	 my	 own	 Utopian	 law	 school	 for	 the	 21st	
century.20	My	proposal	 requires	 an	elite	university	with	an	endowment	 that	
its	trustees	might	be	willing	to	invest	in	the	creation	of	a	morally	independent	
legal	profession	of	lawyers	unwilling	to	surrender	their	autonomy	to	mindless	
or	greedy	hierarchs.	My	Utopian	law	school	would	simply	foreswear	tuition,	
proclaiming	 that	 it	 would	 conduct	 the	 best	 three-year	 program	 it	 could	
without	charging	students	 for	 it.	Classes	would	be	 large,	and	services	other	
than	 classroom	 teaching	would	 be	minimal.	 In	 order	 to	 assure	 their	moral	
independence	in	shaping	their	careers,	students	would	be	enjoined	to	borrow	
no	money	and	to	live	within	their	current	means,	however	modest	those	might	
be.	But	the	university	might	proclaim	that	its	law	school	is	a	contribution	to	
the	Republic,	much	in	the	tradition	envisioned	by	the	18th	century	founders	
19.	 For	comment	on	that	change,	see	Paul	Haskell,	Why	Lawyers	Behave	as	They	Do	(Westview	
Press	1998).
20.	 Paul	D.	Carrington,	On	Ranking:	A	Response	 to	Mitchell	Berger,	 53	 J.	Legal	Educ.	 301	
(2003).
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of	American	university	legal	education,21	and	maintained	by	the	University	of	
Michigan	in	the	time	of	Thomas	Cooley.22	Their	graduates	would	be	instructed	
to	repay	any	indebtedness	they	felt	they	owed	to	the	university	by	serving	the	
public	interest	as	they	might	best	identify	that	interest.
My	Utopian	law	school	would	not	do	well	in	the	rankings	provided	by	US 
News & World Report because	it	could	not	compete	in	the	expenditure	of	money.	
Imaginably,	 it	might	nevertheless	 attract	 adult	 students	who	were	 seriously	
committed	 to	 their	own	moral	values	and	were	willing	and	able	 to	manage	
their	own	intellectual	affairs.	Their	commitments	and	moral	standards	might	
even	 be	 reinforced	 by	 the	moral	 ambience	 created	 by	 their	 classmates.	 Its	
graduates	might	actually	prove	to	have	special	value	to	the	causes	they	chose	
to	 serve.	My	 reading	 of	 “Bull”	Warren’s	memoir	 led	me	 to	 believe	 that	 he	
would	join	in	this	proposal.
21.	 For	a	brief	account,	see	Paul	D.	Carrington,	The	Revolutionary	Idea	of	University	Legal	
Education,	31	Wm.	&	Mary	L.	Rev.	527	(1990).
22.	 Paul	D.	Carrington,	Stewards	of	Democracy:	Law	as	a	Public	Profession	25–34	(Westview	
Press	1999).
